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SUFFERING AGAINST THEIR WILL: THE
TERMINALLY ILL AND PHYSICIAN
ASSISTED SUICIDE - A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
All individuals are afforded due process and equal protection of
the law by the United States Constitution1 absent overriding state
interests.2 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 3 ensures that persons will not be denied life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law.4 The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment 5 guarantees that all individuals of
one class will be treated equally under the law. 6 These constitu-
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating all persons are entitled to Due Process and Equal
Protection of laws); see also JOHN F. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 11.1-11.4, 14.1-14.46 (1991) (discussing Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses);
RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
12-13, 314 (1986) (explaining Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Equal Pro-
tection Clause and protection afforded under these provisions); Todd Connors, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Using Separation of Powers Analysis to Guide Judicial Decision
Making, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 203, 230 n.50 (1994) (noting implications of Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses); Robert F. Benintendi, Comment, The Role of the Com-
prehensive Plan in Ohio: Moving Away From the Traditional View, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV.
207, 227 n.79 (1991) (recognizing individuals' rights to equal protection and due process of
law).
2 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 299,
303 (1995) [hereinafter Leaving Things] (recognizing otherwise unconstitutional statutes
may be upheld if implemented by least intrusive means of achieving legitimate state inter-
est); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1152 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Right to Die] (noting state interests may trump individual's rights).
3 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state... shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law." Id.
4 See Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
133, 134 (1997) (recognizing protections afforded by Due Process Clause); Leaving Things,
supra note 2, at 66 (discussing implications of due process).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1. "No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of laws." Id.
6 See ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 317 (explaining Equal Protection Clause guarantees
similarly situated people be treated in same manner and requires any governmental classi-
fication not be based on impermissible criteria or arbitrarily be used to burden certain
groups of individuals); Kathy T. Graham, Last Rights: Oregon's New Death With Dignity
Act, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 601, 626-630 (1995) (explaining that Equal Protection Clause
requires states treat similarly situated people equally); Kenneth W. Simmon, Overinclu-
sion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 456 (1989) (discussing that
equal protection of law requires all similarly situated people be treated equally and laws
creating such classifications be reasonable in light of its purpose); Mark Strasser, Family,
Definitions and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 981, 1018 (1991) [hereinafter Family Definitions] (discussing equal protection).
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tional issues are present with regard to physician assisted
suicide. 7
Currently, a physician's removal of life sustaining apparatus
from a terminal patient is a permissible alternative to a pro-
longed, vegetative life." Under certain circumstances, the removal
of life sustaining treatment from a patient does not give rise to
either criminal or civil responsibility.9 A terminal patient, not de-
pendent on life support, however, may not legally have a health
care provider assist in their suicide.' °
Unlike assisted suicide, it has been established that the re-
moval of life support is not "killing"" and is a constitutional right
7 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (addressing equal protection ramifi-
cations with regards to physician assisted suicide), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Compas-
sion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 1997) (addressing due process
implications when denying physician aided death), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1170-71 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (holding mentally competent, terminally ill adult does not have liberty interest
in physician-assisted suicide); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994) (con-
cluding there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest permitting physician assisted
suicide).
8 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (stating
Constitution grants competent adults right to refuse or remove life sustaining medical
treatment); see also Quill, 80 F.3d at 727 (recognizing individual's right to reject or remove
life saving devices); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976) (allowing withdrawal of
life support for woman in persistent vegetative state); Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Sub-
stituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dy-
ing, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
1193, 1249 (1996) (discussing judicial recognition of comatose patient's right to terminate
life support); Steven G. Neeley, The Right to Self Directed Death: Reconsidering An Ancient
Proscription, 36 CATH. LAw. 111, 134 (1995) (noting constitutional protection of right to
remove life sustaining medical treatment).
9 See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 450 (2d ed. 1995) (noting responsibility under law
does not attach for doctor's proper removal of life support from patient); see also Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 279 (recognizing Constitution grants competent adult right to refuse life sus-
taining medical treatment); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1242 (N.J. 1985) (stating that in
absence of bad faith, participant in decision to remove life support will not be held liable for
such action); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669 (stating removal of life sustaining treatment
did not constitute homicide); In re Storar 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981) (holding removal of
life support from willing patient does not constitute crime); Thomas A. Raffin, Withholding
and Withdrawing Life Support: Medical Aspects in LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINE (James R.
Vevaina et al. eds., 1989) (noting that there is no liability for removal of life support).
10 See T. Howard Stone & William J. Winslade, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Eutha-
nasia in the United States, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 481, 482 (1995) (noting physician-assisted
suicide is not permitted in majority of states). But see Quill, 80 F.3d at 716 (declaring state
prohibition on assisted suicide unconstitutional); Compassion, 79 F.3d at 790 (holding state
statutory ban on assisted suicide unconstitutional).
11 See Jody B. Gabel, Release From Terminal Suffering? The Impact of Aids On Medi-
cally Assisted Suicide, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 369, 389 (1994) (noting no criminal liability
arises when physician removes life support); M. L. Tina Stevens, The Quinlan Case Revis-
ited: A History of the Cultural Politics of Medicine and the Law, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 347, 347 (1996) (stating physician who removes life support from patient is not subject to
criminal prosecution); Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burnam, Physician Aid in Dying: A
Human Option, A Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 495, 504-508
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protected by the Due Process Clause.' 2 That is, a recognized lib-
erty interest exists which permits physicians to remove life sus-
taining medical treatment.' 3 There is, however, no acknowledged
constitutional right that allows a terminally ill individual to end
their life with assistance.' 4
Courts have traditionally differentiated between removal of life
support and physician assisted suicide, creating two separate
classes: those on life support and those not on life support.
15
Courts have found that these terminal individuals are not
similarly situated and thus similar treatment under law is
unwarranted.'
6
(1995) (noting removal of life support is not defined as "killing"). See generally Physician-
Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARv. L. REv. 2021, 2021 (1992)
[hereinafter Right to Die With Assistance] (exploring right to die issues).
12 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (holding competent person has constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225
Cal. Rptr. 297, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating right to refuse medical treatment is part of
fundamental right of privacy protected by state and federal constitutions); McKay v. Berg-
stedt, 801 P.2d 617, 621 (Nev. 1990) (noting individual's decision to refuse unwanted medi-
cal treatment is constitutionally protected); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (holding right
of privacy is broad enough to encompass individual's decision to decline medical treatment
in certain situations); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983) (recognizing competent
patient who is terminally ill has constitutional right of privacy to refuse medical treatment
when no countervailing state interest exists); see also LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUrIONAL LAW § 15-11 (1988) (analyzing constitutional issues implicated in individual's de-
cision to terminate or refuse life sustaining medical treatment).
13 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (holding competent person has constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment); Quill, 80 F.3d at 716 (recognizing settled
right of individual to reject and remove life sustaining apparatus in New York); see also
Michael Schuster, Health-Care Decision Making Training Module, 324 (PLI Tax Law and
Estate Planning and Administration Course Handbook No. 246 1996) (discussing liberty
interest and right to remove life support); Gabel, supra note 11, at 389 (describing liberty
interest implicated in termination of life support); Mark D. Frederick, Comment, Physician
Assisted Suicide: A Personal Right? 21 S.U. L. REV. 59, 83 (1994) (detailing history of termi-
nation of life support cases).
14 See Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1170-1171 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (conclud-
ing that liberty interest of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not grant
right to physician's aid-in-dying); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 732 (Mich. 1994)
(holding there is no constitutional right to commit suicide); Jonathan R. Macbride, Com-
ment, A Death Without Dignity: How the Lower Courts Have Refused to Recognize that the
Right of Privacy and the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest Protect an Individual's
Choice of Physician Assisted Suicide, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 755, 792 (1995) (arguing that termi-
nally ill adult's "right to die" with physician assistance is logical extension of right of pri-
vacy announced in Roe v. Wade and liberty interest announced in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health).
15 See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 728 (distinguishing between removal of life
support and assisted suicide); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 665 (differentiating between life
support and assisted suicide); McKay, 801 P.2d at 626 (contrasting life support removal
and assisted death).
16 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2293 (1997) (holding there exists no constitutional
right to assisted suicide because it is distinguishable from removal of life support); see also
Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. at 1179 (holding terminally ill patients are not simi-
larly situated to life support dependent individuals); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at
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The distinction between removal of life support and physician
assisted suicide is blurring in the public eye. The Court of Appeals
of the Second 17 and Ninth1 8 Circuits declared state statutes ban-
ning assisted suicide unconstitutional. 19 Both courts focused on
differing aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment when concluding
that the respective state prohibitions on physician assisted suicide
were unconstitutional. 2' The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed these Court of Appeal decisions, holding that the
state statutes banning assisted suicide were constitutional.2 '
The Supreme Court, in Vacco v. Quill,2 2 reversed the Second
Circuit decision, declaring that a New York ban on physician as-
sisted suicide was not unconstitutional. 23 No equal protection vio-
lation was found as patients on and off of life support were not
similarly situated.24 Furthermore, the Court stated that distinc-
tions made between removal of life support and physician assisted
suicide comport with legal principles of causation and intent.25
In a companion decision,26 the Supreme Court overruled the
Ninth Circuit opinion and declared Washington's statute prohibit-
732 n.57 (concluding life dependent patients are not similarly situated with terminal non-
dependent patients).
17 Quill, 80 F.3d at 716. In Quill, the Second Circuit explained that permitting terminal
patients on life-saving devices to terminate their lives while denying this right to terminal
patients not dependent on life support violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The court
declared that only one class of persons existed and therefore the Equal Protection Clause
was violated. Id.
18 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding Due Process
Clause protects physician assisted suicide as liberty interest), rev'd sub nom., Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
19 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 716 (declaring statutory ban on assisted suicide violated Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Compassion, 79 F.3d at 790 (holding state
ban on assisted suicide impinged upon liberty interests protected by Due Process Clause).
20 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 716 (focusing on equal protection violation regarding banning
physician assisted suicide); cf Compassion, 79 F.3d at 790 (stating statute prohibiting phy-
sician assisted suicide violate Due Process Clause).
21 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2302, 2302 (1997) (reversing Ninth Circuit
decision by declaring that Washington's statute did not violate Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment); Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2293 (1997) (reversing Second Circuit
decision by declaring state statute prohibiting physician assisted suicide did not violate
Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
22 117 S. Ct. at 2293.
23 See id. (upholding New York statute banning physician assisted suicide).
24 See id. (concluding that different treatment of those terminally ill individuals not de-
pendent on life support and those who are dependent on life support did not violate Equal
Protection Clause).
25 See id. (finding patients on and off life support not similarly situated).
26 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2258 (stating distinctions made between removal of life
support and physician assisted suicide are based in principles of causation and intent).
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ing assisted suicide constitutional.27 The Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that there is a liberty interest in determining
the time and manner of one's death by physician assisted sui-
cide.28 Using a historical approach, the Court concluded that as-
sisted suicide was not deeply rooted in our nation's traditions so as
to warrant protection as a liberty interest.2 9 Moreover, the Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Casey v. Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.3 ° and Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Dep't of Heath3 1 lead to a recognition that highly personal
decisions, such as the right to hasten one's death, is a protected
liberty interest.32
This Note argues that bans on physician assisted suicide are at
odds with current constitutional jurisprudence and should be in-
validated. Part One discusses both historical and present atti-
tudes towards suicide. Part Two addresses equal protection
ramifications of denying the terminally ill the right to physician
assisted suicide. Part Three explores an individual's liberty inter-
est in seeking physician assisted suicide and asserts that the right
to assisted suicide is subsumed within one's protected liberty in-
terest. Part Four analyzes the implicated state interests that have
traditionally been offered to support an individual's right to physi-
cian assisted suicide. Balancing the relevant state interests
reveals that a ban on assisted suicide does not effectuate state
aims.
I. HISTORICAL AND PRESENT ArITUDES TowARDs SUICIDE
The issue of how to treat suicide is not unique to modern day
society.33 The historical roots of the acceptability of suicide date
27 See id. at 2261 (declaring that Washington's statute which prohibits physician's aid-
in-dying does not violated Fourteenth Amendment).
28 See id. at 2258. The Court's substantive due process analysis had two prongs. Id. at
2268. First it examined whether the interest or fundamental right at issue was deeply
rooted in our nations history or tradition. Id. Second, the Court required that the right or
interest be carefully defined. Id.
29 See id. at 2263 (rejecting assisted suicide as protected liberty interest).
30 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
32 See id. at 2269-2271 (recognizing liberty interest exists to permit one to hasten death).
33 See Robert Barry, The Development of the Roman Catholic Teachings on Suicide, 9
NoTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 449, 462 (1995) (describing Roman views on act of
suicide); Macbride, supra note 14, at 758 (discussing Ancient Greek attitude towards sui-
cide); Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 20-26
(1985) (detailing Ancient Greek philosophers' differing views on suicide); see also Sharon
M. Tomao, The Cultural Defense: Traditional or Formal?, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 241, 249
1996]
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back to ancient Greece34 and Rome,35 where the practice was
deemed an appropriate response in situations involving painful,
incurable disease6.3  This partial acceptance of suicide, however,
was not embraced by early American law, which followed the
English common law tradition by criminalizing the act .3  Ameri-
can views on suicide also are rooted in its Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion.3 9 Suicide continues to be an affront to the teachings of Chris-
tianity which regards every life as valuable, regardless of the
(1996) (observing that in Japanese culture it was acceptable practice for woman "linked" to
infidelity to commit suicide). See generally MARGARET C. JASPER, THE RIGHT TO DIE 1 (1996)
(suggesting that many primitive societies viewed assisting suicide as act of mercy and
respect).
34 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that
in Ancient Greece suicide was deemed praiseworthy), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); JASPER, supra note 33, at 2 (discussing and defining euthana-
sia as meaning "good death"); see also HELGA KUSHE, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE DOCTRINE IN
MEDICINE, 17 (1987) (noting Greek philosophers considered suicide viable option where life
no longer held any value); G. STEVEN NEELEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE 35
(1994) (stating Plato believed certain exceptions existed to general prohibition against sui-
cide) (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (trans. B. Jowett) (1973)); Macbride, supra note 14, at
758 (discussing instances where suicide was deemed appropriate by ancient Greeks). But
see Antouious P. Tsarouhas, The Case Against Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 793,
794 (1994) (citing JAMES RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE 8 (1986)) (noting that Pythagoras,
Plato, and Aristotle believed that suicide was cowardly).
35 See Compassion, 79 F. 3d at 806 (noting that Romans believed that to live noble life
included dying nobly); see also Barry, supra note 33, at 462 (recounting that Romans com-
mitted suicide to preserve honor and escape shame); Cara Elkin, Renewed Compassion for
the Dying in Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 8
(1996) (noting euthanasia was accepted practice in Rome); Michael J. Roth, A Failed Stat-
ute, Geoffrey Feiger, and the Phrenetic Physician: Physician-Assisted Suicide in Michigan
and a Patient Oriented Alternative, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1415, 1421 (1994) (noting Romans
viewed absolute ban on suicide as unreasonable). But see NEELEY, supra note 34, at 39
(noting Roman law never included prohibition against suicide) (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS,
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 253 (1972)).
36 See Roth, supra note 35, at 1420 (discussing Greek and Roman view that absolute ban
on suicide was unreasonable).
37 See Christopher L. Marzetti, Compassion in Dying v. Washington: Physician Assisted
Suicide - A Constitutional Right to Wholesale Murder, 31 GONz. L. REV. 503, 506 (1996)
(noting that suicide was considered criminal offense in United States until nineteenth cen-
tury); Roth, supra note 35, at 1422 (noting later western cultures did not reflect Roman and
Greek acceptance of suicide); Wendy N. Weingand, Has the Time Come For Doctor Death:
Should Physician Assisted Suicide Be Legalized?, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 321, 350 n.3 (1993) (ac-
knowledging acceptability of suicide in ancient Greece and Rome).
38 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 808. In early American history, suicide was criminalized.
Id.; Mary Margaret Penrose, Assisted Suicide: A Tough Bill to Swallow, 20 PEPP. L. REV.
689, 697 (1993). English common law viewed suicide as a felony. Id.; Marzen, supra note
33, at 57. There is legal authority dating back to the thirteenth century prohibiting suicide.
Id.; Stone & Winslade, supra note 10, at 483. England abandoned the criminalization of
suicide in 1961. Id.
39 See Matthew P. Previn, Note, Assisted Suicide and Religion: Conflicting Conceptions
of the Sanctity of Human Life, 84 GEO. L.J. 589, 607 (1996) (noting Judeo-Christian concept
of sanctity of life is ingrained in cultural and legal fabric of American life).
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quality of that life.4" By the end of the eighteenth century, how-
ever, six of the original colonies abolished all penalties for sui-
cide.4 Currently, no state imposes criminal penalties for sui-
cide.42 Conversely, assisted suicide is banned in forty-nine of the
fifty states43 even though current public attitudes are more "ac-
40 See Marzen et al., supra note 33, at 26 (detailing effect of Christianity in Roman Em-
pire); Thomas Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy Death: From Ancient Greece Beyond
Cruzan Toward a Reasoned Legal Response to the Societal Dilemma of Euthanasia, 71 DEN-
VER U. L. REV. 175, 185 (1993) (commenting on distinction between early Christians value
of all life and Greeks and Romans focus on quality of life); see also Compassion, 790 F.3d at
807 (noting that Sir Thomas Moore, canonized by Roman Catholic Church, strongly advo-
cated permitting terminally ill patient to commit suicide with or without assistance of
others); JASPER, supra note 33, at 2 (noting in Christian culture, suicide was denounced,
and person who committed suicide was denied proper burial).
41 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 808 (stating early colonies did not penalize suicide); see
also Marzen et al., supra note 33, at 68 (explaining rationale for abolishing penalties for
suicide) (citing S.F.C. MILSoM, HISTORICAL FouNDATION OF THE COMMON LAw (1981)).
42 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 74
(1972). Currently, no penalty exists for acts of suicide. Id.; Willard C. Shih, Assisted Sui-
cide, The Due Process Clause & "Fidelity in Translation", 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1275
(1995). Suicide remains legal today. Id.; David L. Sloss, The Right to Choose How to Die: A
Constitutional Analysis of States Laws Prohibiting Physician-Assisted Suicide, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 937, 953 (1996). Common law jurisdictions often refer to suicide as criminal, but they
are not treated as such. Id.
43 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.080(a), (f) (Michie 1996);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3210 (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-13-905(a), (f), 20-17-
210(a), (g) (Michie 1991 and Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7191.5(a), (g)
(West Supp. 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4723 (West Supp. 1997); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§§ 15-14-504(4), 15-18-112(1), 15-18.5-101(3), 15-18.6-108 (1987 and Supp. 1996); Com.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-575 (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 16, § 2512 (Supp. 1996); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-2430, 21-2212 (1995 and Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. §§ 765.309(1), (2) (Supp.
1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-11(b), 31-36-2(b) (1996); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D-13
(1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-152 (Supp. 1996); ILL. CoMP. STAT., ch. 755, §§ 35/9(f), 40/5, 40/50,
45/2-1 (West 1992); IND. CODE §§ 16-36-1-13, 16-36-4-19, 30-5-5-17 (1994 and Supp. 1996);
IOWA CODE §§ 144A.11.1-144A.11.6, 144B.12.2 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,109 (1985);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.638 (Banks-Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40:
§§ 1299.58.10(A), (B) (West 1992); MAsS. GEN. LAws 201D, § 12 (1997); MD. CODE HEALTH
ANN. § 5-611(c) (1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 18-A, §§ 5-813(b), (c) (West Supp.1996);
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 700.496(20) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.14, 145C.14
(Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-117(2), 41-41-119(1) (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 459.015.3, 459.055(5) (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-205(1), (7), 50-10-104(1), (6)
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-412(1), (7), 30-3401(3) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.670(2)
(1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:10, 137-H:13, 1374:1 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 26:2H-54(d), (e), 26:2H--77 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-13(B)(1), (C)
(Michie Supp. 1995); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2989(3) (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-320(b), 90-321(f) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01, 23-06.5-01 (1991); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2133.12(A), (D) (Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 63,
§§ 3101.2(C), 3101.12(A), (G) (West 1996); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5402(b) (Supp. 1996); R.I.
GEN. LAWs §§ 23-4.10-9(a), (f), 23-4.11-10(a), () (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-130, 44-
78-50(A), (C), 62-5-504(0) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34-12D-14,
34-12D-20 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-110(a), 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.017, 672.020, 672.021 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 75-2-1116, 75-2-1118 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 5260 (1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994); V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 19, §§ 198(a), (g) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 70.122.070(1), 70.122.100 (Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-10, 16-30A-16(a), 16-
30B-2(b), 16-30B-13, 16-30C-14 (1995); Wis. STAT. §§ 154.11(1), (6), 154.25(7),
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cepting" of the practice.4 4 Moreover, the public seems to be in-
creasingly more accepting of the idea of physician assisted sui-
cide.45 A recent study by the New England Journal of Medicine
surveying San Francisco physicians who treat AIDS patients re-
vealed that fifty-three percent of physicians responding to the sur-
vey would aid patients, in this circumstance, to take their own
lives.46
This trend was evinced by Oregon's Death With Dignity Act
which enabled competent terminally ill adults to obtain a doctor's
prescription for a fatal drug dosage.4 7 A federal district court,
however, declared this act unconstitutional as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 The
court concluded that the statute was over inclusive, as it provided
a means of suicide for both competent and incompetent patients.4 9
It was found that such unequal protection of certain individuals
violated the Equal Protection Clause.50 This opinion, however,
155.70(7) (Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-5-211, 35-22-109, 35-22-208 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1996).
44 See Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TuL. L. REv. 45, 49-53 (1996) (stating
public sentiment is supportive of dying with dignity); Roger F. Friedman, Comment, It's My
Body and I'll Die If I Want To: A Property-Based Argument in Support of Assisted Suicide,
12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 183, 213 n.27 (1995) (stating that public opinion polls
are supportive of right to aid-in-dying).
45 See Compassion, 79 F.3d 790 at 828-29 (indicating opinion polls indicate greater ac-
ceptance of assisted suicide); see also Elizabeth Gmyrek England, Note, The Debate on Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide Reaches the Federal Courts: A Discussion of the Decisions of the
District and Circuit Courts in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 16 PACE L. REV. 359,
407 (1996) (noting increasing acceptance of assisted suicide).
46 See Lee R. Slome, Physician Assisted Suicide and Patient's With Human Immune Defi-
ciency Virus Disease, NEW ENG. J. MED., Feb. 6, 1997, at 417 (citing recent study of physi-
cians treating HIV patients revealed 53% of physicians responding admitted assisting their
patients in hastening death); see also David Van Biema, Fatal Doses Assisted Suicide Soars
in an Afflicted Community, TIME MAGAZnm, Feb. 17, 1997, at 72 (noting that between seven
and nine percent of American doctors will assist their patients in dying).
47 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805. (1996). Measure 16 provides:
[an adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal disease,
and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request
for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified
manner.
Id.
48 See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (declaring Death with Dig-
nity Act unconstitutional for violating Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment),
vacated and remanded, 107 F. 3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied sub nom., Lee v. Harder-
oad, No. 96-1824, 1997 WL 274930, at *1 (Oct. 14, 1997).
49 See id. at 1437.
50 See id. at 1438; see also Maureen M. Devlin, Lee v. State of Oregon, 11 IssuEs L. &
MED. 433, 434-35 (1996) (discussing Oregon's Measure 16 and noting that district court in
Lee held Measure 16 lacked adequate safeguards for treatment of terminally ill).
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was vacated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to litigate this matter.5 '
The most well-known advocate of physician assisted suicide is
Dr. Jack Kevorkian who has assisted in the death over fifty indi-
viduals.52 Confronted with the acts of Kevorkian, the Michigan
Legislature passed a law which established assisted suicide as a
felony. 53 Kevorkian has been prosecuted repeatedly by Michigan
authorities under this statute, but has yet to be convicted of a
crime.5 4 Proponents of assisted suicide have challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Michigan statute.55 The Michigan Supreme
Court, in People v. Kevorkian,56 declared that the statute which
criminalized assisted suicide was constitutional,57 refusing to find
that any liberty interest was implicated in committing suicide
with assistance.5 8
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,5 9 the Ninth Circuit de-
clared that the state statute which prohibited physician assisted
suicide violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.60 The court analyzed previous jurisprudence regarding
51 Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir. 1997) (remanding and vacating district
court decision on jurisdictional grounds).
52 See Herbert Hendin, Seduced By Death: Doctors, Patients, and The Dutch Cure, 10
IssuEs L. & MED. 123, 130 (1994) (acknowledging numerous accounts of Kevorkian aiding
death); Weingand, supra note 37, at 331 (discussing various accounts of Kevorkian assist-
ing suicide); see also Clark, supra note 44, at 66-76 (discussing issues surrounding Dr. Jack
Kevorkian).
53 See MICH. COMP. LAws § 752.1027 (1) (1996). The statute provides criminal sanctions
to an individual who knows an individual intends to commit suicide and: "(a) Provides the
physical means by which the other person attempts or commits suicide; (b) participates in a
physical act by which the other person attempts or commits suicide." Id.; see also MacBride,
supra note 14, at 764 (discussing Michigan's response to Kevorkian's actions).
54 See Kevin M. McCarthy, Family Health Care Decision- Making, 68-JAN. N.Y. ST. B.J.
48, 48 (1996) (questioning whether Kevorkian will be convicted of murder or manslaugh-
ter); see also Clark, supra note 44, at 69 (noting jury's unwillingness to convict Kevorkian);
Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS, Infected Surgeons and Dentists, and the Medical Profession's
Betrayal of its Responsibility To Patients, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 57, 111 (1996) (noting
battles over Jack Kevorkian).
55 See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 714 (Mich. 1994) (challenging Michigan law
criminalizing assisted suicide).
56 Id. at 724.
57 See id. at 724 (declaring Michigan statute prohibiting assisted suicide constitutional).
58 See id. at 728 (concluding there is no liberty interest implicated in issue of physician
assisted suicide).
59 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). This litigation was brought by three
terminally ill patients, four physicians and a non-profit organization. Id. at 793.
60 See id. at 838 (holding Washington's statute violated Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1996) (criminalizing assisted
suicide).
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highly personal matters such as abortion and the right to die.6
The court concluded that the right of physician assisted suicide
was subsumed within the liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.6 2 The court never reached an equal protection
analysis, for it concluded that the statute violated the Due Process
Clause.63
The Second Circuit, in Quill v. Vacco,64 declared that the New
York statute which criminalized assisted suicide violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6" The
court reasoned that an equal protection violation existed because
terminally ill patients on life support were allowed to die by re-
moval of life support, while terminal patients not on life support
were not granted any legal assistance in dying.66 The court con-
cluded that these two groups were similarly situated and were de-
nied equal application of the law and therefore the statute prohib-
iting assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 ' The court, however, declined to find
that there was any liberty interest implicated by the right to die
with assistance.6 Both decisions, however, have been reversed by
the Supreme Court.69
61 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 816 (discussing Supreme Court holdings regarding right
to privacy).
62 See id. at 838 (holding that right of terminally ill patient to hasten death is subsumed
within liberty interest protected by Due Process Clause).
63 See id. at 838 (stating that since statute violated due process, there was no need for
equal protection analysis).
64 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). The
plaintiffs in this litigation were three terminally ill patients and three physicians who
sought a declaration that the state statute prohibiting assisted suicide was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 718; see also N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.15 (McKinney 1997). The statute states
that "[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: ... [h]e intentionally
... aids another person to commit suicide." Id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120. 30 (McKinney 1991).
"A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally... aids another
person to attempt suicide." Id.
65 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 731 (holding statutes criminalizing assisted suicide violate Equal
Protection Clause).
66 See id. at 729 (noting differing treatment of terminal patients on life support and
those not life support dependent).
67 See id. at 729 (finding statutory ban on assisted suicide as violation of Equal Protec-
tion Clause).
68 See id. at 724 (concluding no liberty interest is implicated in physician assisted
suicide).
69 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct 2293, 2293 (1997) (reversing decision finding New York
statute unconstitutional); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2258 (1997) (finding
statute prohibiting physician assisted suicide constitutional).
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II. REMOVAL OF LIFE SUPPORT AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE
The "lower Quill court" undoubtedly would agree that because
the decision to live or die on life support is so fundamental it is
impossible to find plausible grounds on which the right to make
the decision to die could be afforded to those on life support but
denied to all others. 70 Nevertheless, most courts have held that
removal from life-sustaining medical treatment, unlike physician
assisted suicide, does not amount to suicide71 and triggers no
criminal culpability for the acting health care provider.72
Despite the underlying similarity between removal of life sup-
port and physician assisted suicide,73 courts have traditionally
held that the two procedures are qualitatively dissimilar.74 Even
though the Equal Protection Clause ensures equal application of
law to members of the same "class",7 5 these courts have found that
70 See Elkin, supra note 35, at 36 (suggesting there is no practical distinction between
active and passive death); Tucker & Burman, supra note 11, at 504 (discussing argument
that similarity between physician assisted suicide and removal of life support warrants
equal treatment of law); Right to Die With Assistance, supra note 11, at 2030 (questioning
denying right to assistance in dying for non life-support dependent patients).
71 See Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 720 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984)
(noting that removal of life support results in death by natural causes); In re Doe, 583
N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Mass. 1992) (acknowledging right to refuse medical treatment does not
constitute suicide); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985) (asserting death is caused
by underlying disease with removal of life support); In re Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 711
(N.Y. Sup. 1982) (declining life saving treatment is not deemed suicide).
72 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 647 (N.J. 1976) (acknowledging removal of life sup-
port has no criminal liability for health care provider); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y.
1981) (holding removal of life support under proper circumstances did not constitute
crime); see also MEISEL, supra note 9, at 450 (recognizing settled right to removal of life
sustaining treatment).
73 See Right to Die With Assistance, supra note 11, at 2021-30 (stating two methods can-
not be distinguished on basis of causation); Sloss, supra note 42, at 956-957 (asserting pro-
cedures can not be differentiated). But see Yale Kamisar, The Reason So Many People Sup-
port Physician Assisted Suicide and Why These Reasons Are Not Convincing, 12 ISSUES L.
& MED. 113, 129 (1996) (discussing distinctions between refusal of medical treatment and
physician assisted suicide).
74 See, e.g., Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2293 (recognizing distinctions between two procedures);
see also Jennifer L. Hoehne, Note, Physician Responsibility and the Right to Death Care:
The Call for Physician Assisted Suicide, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 225 (1993) (highlighting
disparate judicial and legislative treatment of physician assisted suicide and removal of life
support); Jeremey A. Sitcoff, Note, Death With Dignity: Aids and a Call for Legislation
Securing the Right to Assisted Suicide, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677, 691 (1996) (acknowl-
edging that courts have excluded physician assisted suicide from general acceptance of life
support removal).
75 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608 (1974)
(noting equal protection prevents disparity in treatments between classes of individuals
who are similarly situated); Raffi S. Baroutian, The Advent of the Multifactor, Sliding-Scale
Standard of Equal Protection Review: Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Anal-
ysis in Romer v. Evans, 30 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 1277, 1287 (1997) (recognizing Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires similar treatment for similarly situated persons).
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two distinct classes exist-those on life support and those not on
life support.76 Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Quill,
therefore, no equal protection violation had been found to exist.77
A. The Basis of the Distinction: Active v. Passive
The distinctions that have been made between life support re-
moval and physician assisted suicide stem largely from the as-
serted disparity between letting die (removal of life support) and
killing (assisted death).7" That is, life support is deemed a passive
event, and assisted suicide is dubbed an active measure.79
1. Omission Theory
Active as opposed to passive measures are distinguished based
on the omission of treatment.80 The standard rationale asserts
that whereas a patient's death results subsequent to foregoing
continued medical care, the death is not caused by the actual dis-
continuation of medical care, but by the underlying condition.8 '
76 See Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1179 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding no
equal protection violation because patients not similarly situated); People v. Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d 714, 732 n.57 (Mich. 1994) (concluding no equal protection violation existed as
life support dependent patients are not similarly situated with terminal non dependent
individuals).
77 See Rachel D. Kleinberg & Toshiro M. Mochizuki, The Final Freedom: Maintaining
Autonomy and Valuing Life in Physician Assisted Suicide Cases, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 197, 197 (1997) (acknowledging that Quill was first case holding ban on physician
assisted suicide constituted equal protection violation); Marc Spindelman, Are the Similari-
ties Between a Woman's Right to Choose an Abortion and the Alleged Right to Assisted
Suicide Really Compelling?, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 775, 846 (1996) (recognizing Quill
marked shift in legal battle regarding constitutionality of physician assisted suicide); see
also Devlin, supra note 50, at 65 (discussing impact of Quill).
78 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 497-498 (noting that distinction was between "ordinary"
and "extraordinary" means); see also Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 484
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (ruling that removing life support is not killing, but merely al-
lowing natural death); Thomas A. Preston, Physician Involvement in Life Ending Practices,
18 SEATLE U. L. REV. 531, 540 (1995) (noting opposing views on suicide).
79 See Daniel Callahan & Margo White, Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide Creat-
ing a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 73 (1996) (recognizing active-
passive distinctions between procedures); Kamisar, supra note 73, at 124 (recognizing life
support removal categorized as passive and physician assisted suicide as active).
80 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 451 (acknowledging action-omission distinction be-
tween removal of life support and physician aided death for death occurring from removal
of life support). See generally Massachusetts v. Golston, 366 N.E.2d 744, 744 (Mass. 1977)
(relieving doctor of criminal liability for removing life support).
81 See Deel v. Syracuse Vet. Admin. Medical Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231, 234 (N.D.N.Y 1990)
(holding death caused by underlying disease); Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 482 A.2d
713, 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating patient dies of "natural causes"); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986) (concluding that removal of
life support results in natural death); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 625-26 (Nev.
1990) (explaining that removal of life sustaining apparatus did not amount to suicide be-
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For example, in In re Bouvia,8 2 a non-terminally ill patient with
severe cerebral palsy was permitted to refuse the use of a feeding
tube. 3 The underlying rationale of the court was that the patient
was deemed to have accepted a death which was brought on by the
omission to treat.8 4
It can not be maintained, however, that when a physician with-
draws life support, he does not play an active role in bringing
about the death of the patient.8 5 No court has held that the re-
moval of life-sustaining apparatus from a dependent patient con-
stitutes suicide, 8 or a crime, v despite the fact that when a physi-
cian removes life-support, it is done so by active measures and the
consequence is a likely death.18
2. Causation
The active-passive distinction used to differentiate between re-
moval of life support and physician assisted suicide has been
rooted in terms of causation where it has been offered that the
underlying disease, not the acts of the physician, cause the pa-
tient's death. 9
cause barrier preventing natural death was removed); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 64 (N.Y.
1981) (noting nature runs it course when life support is removed).
82 In re Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
83 See id. (permitting non-terminal patient to refuse life support).
84 See id. (holding life support removal was omission); see also Barber v. Superior Court,
195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 484 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (withholding of life support did not
amount to suicide as resulting death was consequence of underlying disease or condition);
MEISEL, supra note 9, at 457 (noting that if no distinction was made between "active" and
"passive," courts would be condoning taking of human life).
85 TOM L. BEAuciiAMP, INTENDING DEATH: THE ETHICS OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EuTHA-
NASIA 6 (1996) (arguing doctor causes death when removing life support); Sloss, supra note
42, at 33 (suggesting despite ethical distinctions, removal from life support directly results
in patient's death).
86 See, e.g., Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306 (stating removal of life support was not sui-
cide); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.l (Mass. 1977)
(stating life support removal, unlike suicide, involves no self-destructive behavior).
87 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1976) (rejecting imposition of criminal
liability for removal of life support); Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (finding no criminal
liability for removal of life support).
88 See Lowell C. Brown & Shirley J. Paine, Physician Assisted Suicide: Pros and Cons of
First Federal Case, 11 No.7 HEALTHSPAN 3, 8 (1994) (questioning ban on physician assisted
suicide because consequence is same as in removal of life support); see also Nicholas A.
Gumpel, Crimes of Compassion: An Argument for the Legalization of Physician Assisted
Suicide, 17 HAMLNm' L. REv. 337, 371 (1993) (noting in similar circumstances, state inter-
est in removal of life support and assisted suicide are identical).
89 See In re Conroy, 457 A.2d 1232, 1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (asserting that
declining life saving treatment did not constitute suicide because refusal brings about nat-
ural death); see also Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 733 (Mich. 1994) (contending
that in letting die, cause of death is underlying condition, while in assisted suicide, death is
caused by lethal act).
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A causation analysis demonstrates that the doctor's act of re-
moving life support meets the but-for test of causation, as were it
not for the acts of the doctor, the patient would not have died
when he did.90 Furthermore, the removal of life support also prove
to be the proximate cause of death even if it is incorrectly catego-
rized as an omission. 91 Where in fact death may be of underlying
disease, the on-set of death by disease may be characterized as an
independent intervening cause, not superseding the doctor's re-
sponsibility.92 That is, death is a foreseeable and probable result
of life support removal.93
Furthermore, if a health care provider were to accidentally re-
move the ventilator from a willingly dependent patient, it would
be said that the doctor's actions killed the patient, not that the
individual died of natural causes. 94 The act of the physician is
causally no different than the acts of a stranger who walked into
the hospital and removed the patient's life-line. 95
It is inappropriate to say that removal of life support in the form
of feeding and hydration tubes results in natural death with no
causal link between death and acts of a physician. 96 Withdrawal
90 See Right To Die With Assistance, supra note 11, at 2029 (asserting removal of life
support may be cause in fact of death); see also Sloss, supra note 42, at 56 (noting doctor's
removal of life support without permission is proximate cause of death).
91 See Darlene Shadid, Right to Die: Oklahoma's Position on Nutrition and Hydration:
Confusing or Unconstitutional, 43 OiA. L. REv. 143, 158 (1990) (recognizing argument
that removal of life support causes death).
92 See id. (reasoning life support removal is actual cause of death, not underlying dis-
ease). But see Nebraska v. Meints, 322 N.W.2d 809, 814 (Neb. 1982) (finding removal of life
support was not intervening cause so to relieve accused of homicide).
93 See Edward R. Grant & Clark D. Forsythe, The Right of the Last Friends: Legal Issues
for Physicians and Nurses in Providing Nutrition and Hydration, 2 IssuEs L. & MED. 277,
280 (1987) (stating it is questionable to find no causation exists when withdrawing certain
forms of life support); Marni J. Lerner, Note, State National Death Acts: Illusory Protection
of Individuals' Life Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 201 (1992)
(finding causal nexus between death and removal of life support under certain circum-
stances); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (stating intervening act takes
effect after another action and which contributes to causing injury).
94 See BEAucHAMP, supra note 85, at 106-107 (exploring situations where actor deemed
to have killed patient); Sloss, supra note 42, at 56 (noting doctor's act against will of life
support dependent patient is cause of death).
95 See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 85, at 107 (arguing that all termination of life is criminal);
see also Sloss, supra note 42, at 956-57 (stating physician's act in removal of life support
and assisted suicide can not distinguished). See generally Washington v. Yates, 824 P.2d
519 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding removal of life support by third party was proximate
cause of death).
96 See Grant & Forsythe, supra note 93, at 277 (recognizing causal link may exist be-
tween act and death when feeding and hydration tubes is removed); see also Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (questioning no causation finding when removal of life support is
in form of hydration and nutrition tube), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Lerner, supra note
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of this form of support is frequently an independent cause of death
by starvation and dehydration9 7 and not from the underlying dis-
ease.98 Where removal of feeding and hydration tubes is sought,
there is a "death by gradual starvation and dehydration."99
Holding that no causation exists between a doctor's acts and
death when removal of life support occurs is a policy based, ethical
distinction made to exempt a physician, morally and legally, for
the death of a patient.'01 It is, therefore, improper to distinguish
between the two procedures on the basis of causation. 10 1
3. Duty Provides Causal Link Between Death and
"Omission" When Removing Life Support
As has been asserted, a doctor removing life support may escape
criminal liability by the inappropriate categorization of such re-
moval as an omission where no causal link is found to exist be-
tween the procedure and the patient's death. This was based on a
finding that a health care provider was under no duty to continue
medical treatment once it had been undertaken. 0 2 The physi-
93, at 201 (rejecting no causation theory regarding removal of feeding and hydration
tubes).
97 See Grant & Forsythe, supra note 93, at 280; see also Quill, 80 F.3d at 729 (stating
death from removal of feeding and hydration tube is not of natural causes); Amicus Brief of
Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 8-9, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No.
95-1858) available in 1996 WL 708956 (discussing that feeding and hydration tube removal
causes death).
98 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 729 (removal of feeding and hydration tubes causes death by
starvation and dehydration); see also Randall M. England, Note, Withdrawal of Nutrition
& Hydration from Incompetent Patients in Missouri: Cruzan Ex Rel Cruzan v. Harmon, 54
Mo. L. REv. 714, 722 (1989) available in 1996 WL 708956 (arguing that feeding and hydra-
tion removal does not cause death).
99 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2309 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing re-
moval of feeding and hydration tubes).
100 See Grant & Forsyth, supra note 93, at 280 (questioning finding no causation when
removing certain forms of life support); Lerner, supra note 93, at 201 (stating that finding
no causation when removing feeding and hydration manipulates causation); Right to Die
With Assistance, supra note 11, at 2028-29 (noting causation argument is circular, policy
based distinction); Sloss, supra note 42, at 956-57 (acknowledging that causation distinc-
tion made between removal of life support and physician assisted suicide is largely policy
based).
101 See BEAucHAmp, supra note 85, at 106 (stating it cannot be maintained that "pulling
of the plug" does not directly cause death of patient); see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting cause of death
in removal of life support and assisted suicide is conscious decision to end one's life); James
Bopp, Jr., Nutrition and Hydration For Patients: The Constitutional Aspects, 4 IssuEs L. &
MED. 3, 14 (1988) (stating death was from removal of feeding and hydration tube is not
underlying, natural causes); Right to Die With Assistance, supra note 11, at 2021-29 (an-
nouncing no distinction can be made in terms of causation).
102 See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (hold-
ing physician not liable for omission unless there is legal duty to act); Moira M. McQueen &
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cian's duty to a patient includes an obligation to provide the
patient with "benefits" if possible so long as the "benefits" out-
weighs the "burdens" of such healthcare.' 03 A duty of a physician
to continue treatment is thus measured by a test of proportional-
ity of benefit and burden.1 0 4
By finding no causal link between death and the removal of sup-
port, it is implicit that the doctor had no duty to continue to treat
the patient. When the duties of the physician are analyzed, how-
ever, it seems that relieving a doctor of such duty can not be justi-
fied. It is offered that even though removal of life support is often
inappropriately categorized as an omission, a causal link never
the less exists between the "omission" and death because the doc-
tor should have a duty to provide treatment after undertaking to
do so. Therefore, it is asserted that the removal of certain types of
life support and physician assisted suicide can not be distin-
guished upon a finding that a causal link exists in the former but
not the latter.
The duty of a physician includes an obligation to provide reason-
able, ordinary care. 10 5 In Barber v. Superior Court of the State of
California,10 6 the court concluded that removal of feeding and hy-
dration tubes was legally sanctioned, finding no duty to treat the
patient." 7 Feeding and hydration, however, are to be included as
the most basic sustenance of life and as ordinary, basic types of
James L. Walsh, The House of Lords and the Discontinuation of Artificial Nutrition and
Hydration: An Ethical Analysis of Tony Bland Case, 35 CATH. LAW. 363, 369 (1994) (dis-
cussing "duty of care" analysis of Bland case where court found omission of doctor to treat
triggered culpability only when duty to continue to treat existed).
103 See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. L.
REV. 1173, 1181 (1996) (discussing balance between burdens and benefits in deciding to end
treatment); Clark, supra note 44, at 128-131 (discussing seven proposed criteria for as-
sisted suicide and describing subjectivity of best interests standard); see also Roth, supra
note 35, at 1420-1421 (tracing requirement that physician benefit patient to ancient
Greece's Hippocratic oath).
104 See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Factors under this standard include relief of suffer-
ing, restoration of quality of life and preservation of life. Id. at 493; Norman Cantor, The
Real Ethic of Death and Dying, 94 MicH. L. REv. 1718, 1730-33 (1996). When treating a
patient, this test should be controlling, and respecting the autonomy of the patient should
be the major factor in the analysis. Id. at 1730.
105 See Bopp, supra note 101, at 14 (acknowledging general duties of physician include
obligation to provide ordinary, not extraordinary medical care); Grant & Forsythe, supra
note 93, at 285 (stating doctor is not obliged to provide extraordinary care).
106 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
107 See id. at 484 (recognizing no duty existed for doctor to provide life support); see also




treatment.10 8 Furthermore, where a physician's duty, when a cure
can not be found, is the alleviation of pain, it can not be said that a
physician fulfills his contractual obligations to a patient if he does
not provide a service that can appease pain. 10 9
Due to the fact that a physician may be relieved of the duty to
continue to provide life support, it is implicit that the burdens of a
prolonged life outweigh the benefits of such a life. It does not logi-
cally flow, however, that a terminal patient not dependent on such
devices, reaps greater benefits than burdens by being kept alive
when compared to a life-support dependent patient. An alert ter-
minal patient suffers great pain, while the vegetative patient on
life support experiences no negative sensations. 110 Both patients
are terminally ill and thus by definition receive no tangible medi-
cal benefits by being kept alive.
Based on the foregoing, it is asserted that a physician provides
greater benefits than burdens to a terminal, non-dependent pa-
tient by assisting in death. Therefore, relieving a doctor of the
duty to continue to provide treatment in the former but not the
latter scenario can not be justified by this circular ideology."'
B. Intent
It has been proffered that a support dependent patient who
wishes to forego or discontinue life support has no specific intent
108 See Grant & Forsythe, supra note 93, at 288 (stating feeding and hydration are most
elemental types of treatment); see also Bopp, supra note 101, at 314 (describing feeding and
hydration as ordinary care); Donald C. Wintersheimer, The Role of the Court in Terminat-
ing Nutrition and Hydration for Incompetent Patients, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 453, 460 (1995)
(stating nutrition and hydration are ordinary aspects of care and are not treatment);
Hoehne, supra note 74, at 245 (noting physicians' reluctance to terminate feeding and
hydration).
109 See James Reitman, The Debate on Assisted Suicide-Redefining Morally Appropriate
Care for People with Intractable Suffering, 11 IssuEs L. & MED. 229, 302 (1995) (discussing
physician's duty to relieve suffering of patient).
110 See Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decision Making for Incompetents, 29
UCLA L. REV. 386, 402 (1981) (stating vegetative patients feel no pain); Mark Strasser,
Incompetents and the Right to Die: In Search of Consistent Meaningful Standards, 83 Ky.
L.J. 733, 772 (1994-1995) (acknowledging comatose patient experiences no pain).
111 See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1900) (noting duty may arise in
doctor-patient relationship); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A
(1965) (stating positive duty to act exists when intended beneficiary relies on voluntary
undertaking). See generally ALAN MEISEL, RIGHT TO DIE, MEDICO LIBRARY 76 (1989) (assert-
ing that there may be duty to act in doctor-patient context); Reitman, supra note 109, at
303 (claiming that physician's contractual obligation is to provide patient with autono-
mously chosen services).
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to die." 2 This argument confuses intent and motive, as intent
includes the desire to bring about physical consequences, while
motive includes the purpose that precipitates. 1 3 Both a request
for assistance in dying and a decision to terminate life support
include one's intent to bring about death.114 Both patients intend
to bring about their own death but the motives for death will
vary. 115 It has been observed that "there may be little distinction
between the intent of a terminally-ill patient who decides to re-
move her life support and one who seeks the assistance of a doctor
in ending her life ... [as in] both situations, the patient is seeking
to hasten a certain, impending death.""' 6
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THE
EXISTENCE OF A LIBERTY INTEREST FOR PHYSICIAN
ASSISTED SUICIDE
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause states that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of the law." 1 7 Constitutional jurisprudence recog-
nizes that there are both procedural and substantive aspects of
the Due Process Clause."" Procedural due process analysis exam-
112 See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990) (stating that removal of life
support is removal of natural barrier to death); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 82 n.2
(N.Y. 1990) (contending patient seeking life support removal did not want to die); see also
In re Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (asserting patient's opting for
removal of life support because of pain was not suicide); Vicki L. Gilbreath, The Right of the
Terminally Ill to Die with Assistance if Necessary, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 403, 414 n.74 (1986)
(noting patient on life support is not seeking self-destructive behavior, while patient not on
life support is said to have specific intent to die).
113 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 243 (discussing motive and intent).
114 See id. at 462-63. When life support is removed, the intended consequence is obvious
to both patient and doctor. Id.
115 See id. at 463 (noting argument stating life support removal patient lacks specific
intent to die confuses intent and motive); Tucker & Burman, supra note 11, at 504 (stating
request for removal of life support and physician assisted suicide are made for same rea-
sons); see also Joel R. Cornwell, Wrongful Life and the Problem of Euthanasia, 23 GONZ. L.
REV. 573, 583 (1988) (discussing intent regarding removal of support and assisted suicide).
116 Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2307, 2310 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting lack of
"intent" distinction).
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
118 See ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 17.1 (explaining substantive and procedure due process
analysis); Juliene C. Scocca, Comment, Society's Ban on Same-Sex Marriages: A Reevalua-
tion of This So-Called "Fundamental Right" of Marriage, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 719,
769 n.26 (1992) (discussing difference between substantive and procedural due process); see
also Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (discussing procedural and substantive
components of Due Process Clause); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seri-
ously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV.
1221, 1303 n.247 (1995) (explaining distinctions between procedural and substantive due
process and historical roots of both doctrines); James R. May, Fashioning Procedural and
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ines the process in which the law is made and applied, while sub-
stantive due process analyzes whether the substance of the law is
compatible with the Constitution.'19 Physician aid in dying impli-
cates substantive due process because the issue involves the con-
stitutionality of laws prohibiting an exercise of a liberty inter-
est. 120 Under substantive due process analysis, a court first deter-
mines whether a liberty interest exists, 21 and then examines
whether the challenged statute unconstitutionally impinges upon
the exercise of that liberty interest.'
22
Under a substantive due process analysis, it seems that laws
that prohibit terminally ill patients from choosing the time and
Substantive Due Process Arguments in Toxic and Other Tort Actions Involving Punitive
Damages After Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 22 ENVTL. L. 573, 588 (1992)
(noting that Due Process Clause contains both substantive and procedural components).
119 See Kelly, 425 U.S. at 244 (noting that Due Process Clause affords both procedural
guarantees against deprivation of liberty and likewise "protects substantive aspects of lib-
erty against unconstitutional restrictions"); see also David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of
Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975, 1059 (1992) (discussing sub-
stantive and procedural components of Due Process Clause); Kathleen McGowan, Note,
Physician Assisted Suicide A Constitutional Right?, 37 CATH. LAw. 225, 259 n.46, n.47
(1997) (explaining how Due Process Clause contains procedural and substantive aspects);
Michelle A. Satin, Note, From Mariel Into the Twenty-first Century: The Indefinite Deten-
tion of Cuban Excludable Aliens in the United States, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CrV.
CoNFINEMErr 139, 174 n.18 (1996) (distinguishing between substantive and procedural
due process and protection afforded under each component).
120 See Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg and Quill Amicus Curaie Briefs: Verbatim
Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 7 (1997) (explaining substan-
tive due process arguments implicated in physician assisted suicide); Right to Die, supra
note 2, at 1145 (arguing that substantive due process liberties which include right to refuse
medical treatment should also include right to physician's aid in dying); David L. Fitzger-
ald, Note, Let Justice Flow Like Water: The Role of Moral Argument in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 65 FoaRD~m L. REV. 2103, 2108 (1997) (discussing substantive due process anal-
ysis and physician assisted suicide).
121 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that substantive due process analysis requires court to determine whether any constitu-
tionally protected interest exists), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997); James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The Constitutional Case Against Per-
mitting Physician Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with "Terminal Conditions", 11
IssuE L. & MED. 239, 254 (1995) (stating that first component of substantive due process
analysis examines whether any fundamental rights or liberty interests exist); Daniel T.
Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Clemancy, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 201, 218 (1993) (noting that starting point of substantive
due process analysis is ascertaining whether any constitutionally protected interest exists);
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 15.4 (noting that first step in analysis is determining existence of
constitutionally protected right or liberty interest).
122 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (stating
that once court has determined that liberty interest exists, court must balance exercise of
liberty interest against relevant state interests); Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 301, 321
(1982) (explaining that once liberty interest is recognized, exercise of this interest must be
balanced against relevant state interests to ascertain whether challenged laws unconstitu-
tionally infringe upon exercise of this interest); Compassion, F.3d at 799 (explaining sub-
stantive due process analysis); Bopp & Coleson, supra note 121, at 252 (noting that consti-
tutionally protected interest may be trumped by exercise of compelling state interest).
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manner of death violate the liberty interest guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause.1 23 The choice of a terminally ill patient to
hasten death with physician assistance does not implicate any
new right or liberty interest, 124 but rather is subsumed within the
right to privacy. 125 This right is an extension of the individual's
existing right to terminate life sustaining medical treatment. 126 A
competent terminally ill patient's liberty interests are threatened
when he or she is unable to make this personal decision without
interference by the state.127
The right of the terminally ill to end suffering by hastening in-
evitable death 128 is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tra-
123 See Brief of Respondents at 46, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-110) available in 1996 WL 708925 (contending that liberty interest implicated in
physician assisted suicide is similar to recognized liberty interest in right to terminate life
support); Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices: Voting Life & Death at
the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 799 (1995) (advocating recognition of consti-
tutionally protected liberty interest in decisions regarding death, including physician aid in
dying); Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional Rights and
Remedies, 55 MD. L. REV. 292, 304 (1996) (arguing that laws prohibiting terminally ill indi-
viduals from obtaining physician's assistance in dying violates liberty interest protected by
due process).
124 See Gabel, supra note 11, at 387 (arguing that right to assisted suicide follows from
previous Supreme Court decisions which have recognized right to refuse medical treatment
and cases involving personal autonomy); Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: The
Secret Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1310 (1993) (contend-
ing that distinguishing withdrawal of life support and physician's aid in dying is illusory
because result is same in each case); Sitcoff, supra note 74, at 690 (asserting that right to
die with assistance is logical extension of right to terminate life support).
125 See NEELEY, supra note 34, at 79 (arguing that right of individual to hasten one's
death with assistance is subsumed within right to privacy); Frederick, supra note 113, at
59 (discussing constitutional reasons why physician assisted suicide should be permitted);
John A. Powell & Adam Cohen, The Right To Die, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 169, 170 (1994)
(arguing that right to die with assistance is constitutionally protected based on personal
autonomy, right of privacy and due process liberty interest); Steven J. Wolhander, Volun-
tary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right To Privacy, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 363, 363 (1984) (contending competent terminally ill person has constitu-
tionally protected right to determine time and manner of their own death).
126 See The Right to Die With Assistance, supra note 11, at 2024-28 (stating right to die
with assistance is part of broader right to die and thus constitutionally protected); Mac-
Bride, supra note 14, at 793 (arguing that right to die with assistance is logical extension of
right of privacy and liberty interest announced in previous Supreme Court decisions); see
also Brian C. Goebel, Who Decides If There is "Triumph in the Ultimate Agony?" Constitu-
tional Theory and the Emerging Right to Die With Dignity, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 864
(1996) (contending that right to die with dignity falls squarely within liberty protected by
Fourteenth Amendment).
127 See Frederick, supra note 113, at 107 (arguing that any prohibition against assisted
suicide of terminally ill patient can only be justified by compelling state interest); Christo-
pher N. Manning, Note, Live and Let Die?: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right To
Die, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 513, 535 (1996) (contending state's interest in refusing to recog-
nize "right to die" is not "slippery slope" argument).
128 See Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide and the Competent Terminally Ill: On Ordinary
Treatment and Extraordinary Policies, 74 OR. L. REV. 539, 545 (1995) [hereinafter Assisted
Suicide] (arguing that decision of terminal patient to hasten death with assistance of
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dition.'29 The decision of a terminally ill individual to hasten
death and die with dignity was, in certain circumstances,
praised. 130 While states have relevant interests in preventing sui-
cide' 31 and preserving life,' 32 these interests must be balanced
against the liberty interest implicated by the right of a terminally
ill, competent patient to hasten death with a physician's
assistance. 133
A. Substantive Due Process And Liberty Interests
The substantive due process doctrine acknowledges that the
states' ability to intrude into the personal matters of the individ-
ual is limited. '3 Constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that cer-
others is personal one and should be protected by liberty interest under due process); Todd
D. Robichaud, Note, Toward a More Perfect Union: A Federal Case For Physician Aid-In-
Dying., 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 521, 536 (1994) (asserting that decision of terminal pa-
tient to seek assistance in dying is highly personal right to be protected under due process).
129 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 806-812 (9th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing historical treatment of suicide), rev'd sub nom., Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997).
130 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 806 (discussing Plato's belief that suicide was justifiable
for individuals suffering from painful diseases); THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO BOOK III 406a-409
(Alan Bloom ed., 1968) (stating " [i f any man labor of an incurable disease, he may dispatch
himself if it be to his own good").
131 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 820 (detailing prevention of suicide as relevant state
interest); Edward J. Larson, Prescription for Death: A Second Opinion, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
461, 469 (1995) (discussing state interest in preventing suicide); Right to Die With Assist-
ance, supra note 11, at 2033 (noting state interest in preventing suicide); Assisted Suicide,
supra note 128, at 556 (contending that those states which do not criminalize suicide
should be estopped from using states' interest in prevention of suicide to justify ban on
physician assisted suicide); Previn, supra note 39, at 591 (describing states' interest in
preventing suicide as part of general state interest in preserving life).
132 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 817 (stating that in general, preservation of life is "un-
qualified" state interest); Kate E. Bloch, Note, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Be-
yond Civil Commitment-A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929,
935 (1987) (noting that states' interest in preserving life reflects societal value of life);
Previn, supra note 39, at 591 (discussing state interest in preserving life). But see
Spindelman, supra note 77, at 775 (arguing that state interest in preserving life justifies
prohibition on physician assisted suicide).
133 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (detailing
how in cases involving liberty interest, courts must balance relevant state interests against
individual's interest); Compassion, 79 F.3d at 816 (discussing how court must balance rele-
vant state interest against individual's liberty interest in physician aid in dying); see also
Spindelman, supra note 77, at 850 (discussing balancing test); Paul J. Zwier, Looking For a
Nonlegal Process: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Care Perspective, 30 U. RICH. L. REV.
199, 224 (1996) (noting that states' interest in preservation of life and prevention of suicide
must be balanced against terminally ill individual's liberty interest in hastening death).
134 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (ac-
knowledging state's ability to intrude into matters involving personal choices); Hobbies v.
Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 495 (Mich. 1994) (stating that Due Process Clause lim-
its government interference in personal decisions); Spindelman, supra note 77, at 814 (indi-
cating that Due Process Clause limits power of states interfering in individual's personal
decisions).
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tain "key moments and decisions"'3 5 in a person's life are impene-
trable by the state. 136 The Supreme Court has held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects personal
decisions concerning marriage, 3 7 family relationships, 38 procrea-
tion, 3 9 abortion, 40 contraceptives,'14 and most recently, the right
135 Compassion, 79 F.3d at 912.
136 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 549 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing constitutional protections of deci-
sions of individuals); Thournburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (acknowledging that highly personal decisions affecting personal
liberties of individual should be free from unwarranted government interference). But see
Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2260 (1997) (stating that not all personal deci-
sions are protected from governmental interference).
137 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (declaring that marriage is funda-
mental liberty protected by Due Process Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(acknowledging that right of marriage is protected by Due Process Clause); see also Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage as "basic civil right of man");
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (describing marriage as "most important relation
in life"); Family Definitions, supra note 6, at 1000 (stating that Due Process Clause protects
right to marry); Jodi M. Solovy, Comment, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Marriage and Di-
vorce: Constitutional Accommodation of a Religious Mandate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 513
(1996) (discussing marriage as fundamental right protected by Due Process Clause).
138 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (acknowledging that decisions
regarding family relationships are private matters into which state may not interfere);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (noting that liberty interest protects
parental decisions regarding upbringing and education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (recognizing that decisions relating to home, family and raising of
children are protected by Due Process Clause); see also Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating
Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1003 (1996) (discussing that
family relationships are protected by Due Process Clause); The Right to Die With Assist-
ance, supra note 11, at 2024 (stating that family relationships are protected by due
process).
139 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (noting that substantive due process
protection extends to procreation); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 926 (1992) (stating that right of privacy protects individuals from governmental
intrusion into certain personal matters such as procreation); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (not-
ing that right of procreation is protected liberty interest); see also Philip S. Welt, Adoption
and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really "Strangers without Rights?", 95 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 165, 165 (1995) (discussing how due process protects personal decisions such
as procreation); Jeanne L. Vance, Note, Womb for Rent: Norplant and the Undoing of Poor
Women, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 827, 835 (1994) (noting that right to procreate is implicit
in Due Process Clause).
140 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 839 (holding that personal matters such as abortion are pro-
tected by liberty interest of Due Process Clause); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772 (concluding
that abortion is protected by "private sphere of individual liberty"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973) (holding that right of privacy and personal liberty interest protect woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, The American With
Disabilities Act and the Reproductive Rights of H1V-Infected Women, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L.
57, 71 (1994) (stating that abortion is protected liberty interest); Rachel K Pirner & Laurie
B. Williams, Roe to Casey: A Survey of Abortion Law, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 166, 187 (1993)
(noting that right to abortion is protected liberty interest).
141 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (extending right to
contraceptives to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972) (holding that both
married and single individuals have privacy rights which permits them to obtain contra-
ceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (declaring that right of pri-
vacy exists and extends to married couple's choices regarding contraceptives); see also
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to refuse life sustaining medical treatment.
142
The precise boundaries of the liberty interest 143 protected by the
Due Process Clause have been tested on numerous occasions.'4 In
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,145 the Court
adopted an "evolving doctrinal approach to substantive due pro-
cess"' 46 matters. 47 This approach recognizes that the Constitu-
tion does not operate in a vacuum but rather in a society that is
evolving. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman,"4 argued
that the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause is a
"rational continuum"149 which encompasses freedom from arbi-
trary imposition and purposeful restraints. 150
Sonia C. Davig, Crack-Cocaine Babies: Protecting Society's Innocent Victims, 15 HAMLiNE J.
PuB. L. & POL'Y 281, 294 (1994) (discussing due process protection of right to obtain contra-
ceptives); Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition of Probation: The
Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 1001 (1992) (discussing Supreme Court
jurisprudence recognizing due process protection of right to obtain contraceptives).
142 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (holding
that decision to remove life sustaining medical treatment is protected by liberty interest of
Due Process Clause); see also Terrence A. Kline, Suicide, Liberty and Our Imperfect Consti-
tution: An Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court's Entanglement in Decisions to
Terminate Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 14 CAMPBELL L. REv. 69, 69 (1991) (discuss-
ing Cruzan and removal of life sustaining medical treatment).
143 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Since the boundaries
of the Due Process Clause are not clear, it is argued by some that before any rights or
interests are recognized, they must be analyzed based upon the historic teachings of our
nation. Id. Thus, an interest must be "deeply rooted in our nations history and traditions"
before it is granted constitutional protection. Id.; Casey, 505 U. S. at 849. The Court in
Casey rejected the historical pedigree analysis, stating:
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the tradi-
tions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court
which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on
what has survived is likely to survive.
Id. at 850 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 347 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)) (Harlan, J., dissenting from
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
144 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (noting that substantive due process analysis was difficult
because boundaries of liberties protected were unclear); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (noting exact boundaries of liberty interest have not been defined); Manning,
supra note 127, at 540 (arguing that because exact boundaries of liberty interest protected
by Due Process Clause were unknown, test used to ascertain whether it exists is highly
subjective); Miranda Perry, Comment, Kids and Condoms: Parental Involvement in School
Condom Distribution, 63 U. CHL L. REv. 727, 736 (1996) (stating that existing case law
does not define boundaries of liberty interest protected by Due Process Clause).
145 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
146 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
substantive due process analysis), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct.
2258 (1997).
147 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 (describing liberty interest as part of "rational
continuum").
148 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
150 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "full scope of the liberty interest guaran-
teed by the Due Process Clause is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeful restraints"); Anthony C.
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It seems that physician assisted suicide, when analyzed under
this "rationale continuum",151 implicates a liberty interest which
is protected by the Due Process Clause.' 52 The choice to die with
assistance is a natural and logical extension of previously recog-
nized liberty interests153 such as abortion,15 4 personal auton-
omy,' 55 termination of life support.156
Cicia, Note, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive
Due Process, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2241 (1996) (discussing Justice Harlan's approach
to substantive due process analysis); Goebel, supra note 126, at 845 (describing Justice
Harlan's approach as more flexible because it examines how constitutional jurisprudence
has developed).
151 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992). The
Court held "[n ] either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." Id. The evolution of Supreme Court
jurisprudence in the arena of contraceptive rights is an example of the rationale contin-
uum. Id.; Poe, 367 U.S. at 509. In Poe, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in an action
which challenged the constitutionality of Connecticut's statutes prohibiting the use of con-
traceptives. Id. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). A short time later, in
Griswold, however, the court held that prohibition of distribution of contraceptives under
Connecticut law violated a couple's right to privacy. Id. at 485-86. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 444 (1972). Eight years later, the Court in Eisenstadt, the Court recognized that
the right of privacy concerning contraceptive applied to married as well as single individu-
als. Id. at 444. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 698-99 (1977). Finally, Carey
extended this right to obtain contraceptives to minors. Id. at 698-99.
152 See Clark, supra note 44, at 78 (discussing "rational continuum" and physician as-
sisted suicide); see also Amicus Curaie Brief of 36 Religious Organizations, Leaders, and
Scholars in Support of Respondents at 16, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-
1858) (arguing that rational continuum approach to liberty interest demonstrates that phy-
sician assisted suicide is protected by Due Process Clause).
153 See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 444 (addressing fundamental right to privacy for all
people); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing marriage as fundamental
right); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-486 (addressing fundamental right to privacy); Maynard
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1888) (describing marriage as fundamental right).
154 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 839 (concluding right to abortion is protected by liberty inter-
est of Due Process Clause); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (holding that decision to have children is protected by "pri-
vate sphere of individual liberty"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (declaring that
right of privacy and personal liberty interest protects woman's right to abortion); see also
Pirner & Williams, supra note 140, at 189 (stating that Due Process Clause's liberty inter-
est protects woman's right to abortion).
155 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that decision of terminally ill to hasten death is central to personal dignity and autonomy
of individual), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Janet M.
Branigan, Note, Michigan's Struggle With Assisted Suicide and Related Issues As Illumi-
nated by Current Case Law: An Overview of People v. Kevorkian, 72 U. DEW. MERCY L. REV.
959, 970 (1995) (stating that personal autonomy is encompassed within Due Process
Clause and that right to assisted suicide is implicitly protected by Fourteenth Amend-
ment); see also Brief of Respondents at 189, Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) (arguing constitutional jurisprudence recognizing individual's right of
personal autonomy supports premise of liberty interest for terminally ill for assistance in
dying). But see Spindelman, supra note 77, at 847 (rejecting argument that right to self-
determination or personal dignity can be extended to support right of physician assisted
suicide).
156 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (holding
that liberty interest of Due Process Clause grants competent persons right to refuse lifesav-
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B. Comparison of the Liberty Interest Implicated Abortion and
Physician Assisted Suicide
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
Casey suggests that all personal and intimate decisions of an indi-
vidual are protected by the Due Process Clause. 15 7 In Casey,1 51 the
Court addressed the issue of a woman's right to obtain an abortion
and examined the liberty interests implicit in this right.159 The
Court relied on previous opinions concerning personal decisions
relating to marriage,160 contraception,' 6 ' family relationships,
62
child rearing' 63 and education. 164 The Casey Court reaffirmed that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual's personal and
intimate decisions involving those choices which are central to
ing hydration and nutrition); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976) (holding that
individual's decision to terminate life support is protected by right of privacy); see also Alan
J. Parker, Recent Development in Estate Planning and Federal and Gift Tax, 200 (PLI Tax
Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 228 1992) (noting liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment); Schuster, supra note 13, at 324 (discussing Cruzan
and existing liberty interest in refusing life sustaining medical treatment); Christina Von
Cannon Burdette, Comment, Constitutional Law-Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health- The Supreme Court Reposes the Right-to Die Issue with the Individual States, 20
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 655 (1990) (analyzing Cruzan and discussing constitutional issues
implicated in right to die cases).
157 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270 (1997) (overruling Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of Casey).
158 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (challenging Pennsylvania abortions statutes).
159 See id. at 844-45 (discussing facts of case).
160 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (discussing constitutional protec-
tion of right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (discussing how
right to privacy protects decisions regarding procreation).
161 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (addressing right of
privacy and ban on contraception).
162 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (explaining that Meyer,
Pierce and their progeny establish "private realm of family life" that is protected by liberty
interest of Due Process Clause); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944)
(discussing parental right to raise child); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (holding that parental decisions regarding upbringing and education of children are
protected by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (articulating individual's right to establish home and raise children). See
generally Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Bi-
nary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571, 603 (1995) (discussing constitutional pro-
tection of family relationships).
163 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 n.18 (1979) (stating that Supreme Court deci-
sions in Prince and Pierce suggest constitutionally protected right to raise children without
undue interference by state); Prince, 321 U.S. at 164 (discussing child-rearing); Pierce, 268
U.S. at 535 (noting that liberty interest protects parental decisions concerning education of
children); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (discussing right to raise children); see also Mark
Strasser, Legislative Presumptions and Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting, Adoption,
and the Best Interest of the Child, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 49, 50 (1996) (discussing Casey analy-
sis regarding personal decisions).
164 See, e.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (setting forth right to direct upbringing of chil-
dren); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (addressing fundamental right to raise children); Gilles,
supra note 138, at 1004 (discussing parental rights regarding educating children).
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personal dignity and autonomy. 165 It is asserted that included
among highly personal decisions is the right of a competent termi-
nally ill patient to hasten death with a physician's assistance.
The decision of a terminally ill individual to seek assistance in
hastening death is an innately personal one. 166 This decision is
analogous to the decision of a woman deciding to terminate her
pregnancy. 167 Only the individual suffering from a terminal ill-
ness fully understands the depth of the pain and suffering exper-
ienced. 168 Similarly, during her pregnancy, a woman is subject to
physical constraints, pain and anxieties that are deeply per-
sonal.' 69 The state has no right to force this level of suffering upon
the woman who would prefer to terminate the pregnancy by an
abortion.' 70 Similarly, in the case of physician assisted suicide, it
is only the terminally ill individual who can measure their pain
165 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stat-
ing that decisions such as terminating pregnancy is intimate and personal, and is central to
personal dignity and autonomy of individual); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790, 801 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing Casey and stating that issue of physician assisted sui-
cide is innately personal), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997); see also George J. Annas, "The Right to Die" in America Sloganeering From Quinlan
and Cruzan to Quill & Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 875, 893 (1996) (discussing liberty
interest protecting individual's personal decisions); Clark, supra note 44, at 73 (noting that
certain personal decisions are protected by liberty interest of Due Process Clause).
166 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 813 (comparing woman's decision whether to terminate
pregnancy with that of terminally ill who wishes to hasten death); Annas, supra note 165,
at 892 (describing physician assisted suicide as personal issue); England, supra note 45, at
410 (contending that decision of terminally ill person to terminate their pain and suffering
is personal one and should be protected by liberty interest of Due Process Clause); Robert
L. Mine, The Right to Assisted Suicide in Washington and Oregon: The Courts Won't Allow
a Northwest Passage, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 213, 214 (1996) (noting that advocates of physi-
cian assisted suicide argue that terminal patient's decision to seek physician's aid in dying
is deeply personal deserving constitutional protection); Tucker & Burman, supra note 11,
at 508 (concluding that liberty interest of Fourteenth Amendment protects individual's
right to choose between suffering and less painful dignified death).
167 See Mine, supra note 166, at 220 (discussing comparisons between abortion and as-
sisted suicide); MacBride, supra note 14, at 777-78 (contending liberty interest delineated
in abortion cases encompass terminally ill patient's right to assisted suicide); Manning,
supra note 127, at 525 (addressing conclusions that personal dignity questions are involved
in both physician assisted suicide and abortion); see also Law, supra note 123, at 322 (com-
paring time factors involved in abortion cases and physician assisted suicide cases as im-
portant factor for standing).
168 See Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 453 (Wash. 1987) (discussing issue of pain
and suffering as factor in removal of life support); Robert L. Risley, Ethical and Legal Is-
sues in the Individual's Right to Die, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 597, 610 (1994) (discussing
intense pain individuals in final stages of their life endure); Robert A. Sedler, Constitu-
tional Challenges to Ban "Assisted Suicide". The View from Without and Within, 21 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 777, 778-79 (1994) (noting ban on physician assisted suicide exists re-
gardless of severity of pain and suffering).
169 See Casey, 500 U.S. at 852 (discussing pains of pregnancy).
170 See id.
[T]he mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical con-
straints, to pain that only she bear... Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the
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and suffering, and determine the proper course of action for them-
selves.' 7 ' Since a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy
and end her "suffering" is a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest, 172 such a liberty interest should also be extended to the
terminally ill individual. 173 Therefore, the Supreme Court should
have affirmed the Ninth Circuit opinion, in Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, which correctly noted the similarities between a
woman suffering from an unwanted pregnancy and a terminal pa-
tient suffering in the last stages of life. 174 The court reasoned that
the impact of prohibiting a terminally ill patient from hastening
death and ending their suffering is more significant than when
forcing a woman to continue her pregnancy. Thus, the court con-
cluded a terminal individual should have rights similar to that
which is granted to a woman coping with an unwanted
pregnancy. 7 5
Abortion, like physician assisted suicide, is an emotionally
charged issue' 76 with significant moral and spiritual implica-
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however domi-
nant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture.
Id.
171 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 794-95 (detailing pain and suffering of plaintiffs); Sitcoff,
supra note 74, at 677 (discussing suffering of 34 year old AIDS patient and his wishes to
end his suffering with assistance of others).
172 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (addressing suffering of pregnant woman); see also Clark,
supra note 44, at 74 (comparing suffering of pregnant woman who wishes to terminate
pregnancy with that of terminal patient who seeks physician's assistance in dying); Donald
P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion,
73 N.C. L. REv. 1323, 1403 (1995) (detailing suffering of woman who suffers unwanted
pregnancy); Jay A. Sekulow & John Tushey, The "Center" is in the Eye of the Beholder, 40
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 945, 955 (1996) (describing emotional, psychological or familial suffer-
ing of pregnant woman forced to carry unwanted pregnancy); Spindelman, supra note 77,
at 823 (discussing Casey and pregnant woman's suffering and abortion rights).
173 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 121, at 245-46 (noting that physician's failure in pain
management causes terminal patients to choose death); Elkin, supra note 35, at 40 (dis-
cussing Dr. Quill's guidelines for assisting patient's suicide); Alison C. Hall, To Die With
Dignity: Comparing Physician Assisted Suicide in the United States, Japan and the Nether-
lands, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 837-38 (1996) (noting that guidelines for physician assisted
suicide should include suffering extreme pain that cannot be alleviated).
174 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 814 (noting similarities of "suffering" between abortion
and patient in last stages of terminal illness).
175 See id. (stating "[pirohibiting a terminally ill patient from hastening death would
have an even more profound impact on that person's life than forcing a woman to carry a
pregnancy to term").
176 See England, supra note 45, at 412 (stating that physician assisted suicide and abor-
tion are sensitive issues that lead to emotionally charged debates involving religion); Les-
lie L. Mangin, Note, To Help or Not to Help: Assisted Suicide and its Moral, Ethical and
Legal Ramifications, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 728, 729-30 (1994) (noting that physician
assisted suicide is emotional issue); Sloss, supra note 42, at 937 (describing issue of physi-
cian's aid in dying as emotionally charged).
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tions. 7 7 In Casey,'78 the Court recognized that its role was "to de-
fine the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral code."' 79
While abortion is contrary to many religious teachings, it remains
a legally recognized alternative for those who choose it. Physician
assisted suicide should attain this same recognition.1
8 0
C. The Liberty Interest Implicated by Right to Die Compatible
With a Terminally Ill Patient's Right to Physician
Assisted Suicide
The Supreme Court first addressed the right to die in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health'8 ' where it held that there is a
constitutionally protected liberty interest which allows an individ-
ual to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 8 2 The Court re-
lied on prior decisions implicating individual autonomy and the
ability to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 8 3 Although a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest existed to permit the re-
fusal of life-support, the Court concluded that the interest was not
absolute." 4 The Court employed a balancing test between Nancy
Cruzan's liberty interest in terminating life sustaining medical
treatment and the state's interest in preserving Cruzan's life.18 5
177 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (characterizing abortion as offensive to basic principles of
morality of some); Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy and the Establishment
Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1991) (noting regulation of abortion was religiously motivated);
Elizabeth Mensche & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abor-
tion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1083 (1991) (discussing Catholic concern for spiritual well-being of
mother seeking abortion).
178 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (challenging Pennsylvania abortion statutes).
179 See id. at 850 (discussing moral implications of abortion).
180 See Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging
Health Care Market, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1429, 1463 (1995) (noting that tension between pa-
tient choice and institutional religious beliefs were more acute in physician assisted suicide
context); Graham, supra note 6, at 605-06 (noting many believe physician assisted suicide
repugnant because of religious belief); Previn, supra note 39, at 608 (noting justification for
laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide based solely on religious belief); Tom Stacy,
Euthanasia and the Supreme Court's Competing Conceptions of Religious Liberty, 10 Is-
suEs L. & MED. 55, 58-59 (1994) (addressing that resistance to physician assisted suicide
has strong religious element, but not exclusive reason behind prohibition).
181 497 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1990).
182 See id. at 278 (holding prior decisions compel recognition of constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
183 See, e.g., Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (addressing
issue of individual's right "to be let alone"); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105
N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (considering one's right to decide what will be done to one's own
body).
184 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 (noting that state has important interest in preserving
life).
185 See id. at 271. The Cruzan Court acknowledged that there were four important areas
of relevant state interests implicated in that case. Id. These interests included the preser-
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The state's restriction requiring "clear and convincing" evidence18 6
of the patient's wishes for the removal of life support was constitu-
tionally permissible.'8 7 The Supreme Court found the exercise of
the right to refuse life support was permissible.'
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, acknowledged that a lib-
erty interest protected physical freedom and self-determination in
refusing unwanted medical treatment. 89 A dying patient who is
forced to remain on life sustaining apparatus is likely to feel like a
prisoner of machinery and that burdens the patient's liberty
interests. 190
The terminally ill patient is a "captive" as this individual is cap-
tive in a dying body often suffering constant pain.' This in-
creases the "benefit" received by dying in the benefit-burden bal-
ancing analysis. 92 Comparatively, a patient on life support is
often unconscious and unaware of their pain. 93
Cruzan19 4 focused on the personal autonomy of the individual
and the protection case law provides for individual autonomy. 9 5
vation of life; the protection of innocent third parties; the prevention of suicide; and the
maintenance of the integrity of the medical profession. Id. Similarly, the Cruzan Court
recognized that individual's dependent on life support also had certain interests that must
be counter-balanced against these state concerns. Id. at 272. The Court noted that such
interests included personal autonomy and the right to self determination. Id. at 273.
186 See id. at 284-85 (establishing requirement of clear and convincing evidence).
187 See id. at 284 (affirming use of clear and convincing evidence standard).
188 See id. at 280 (discussing evidentiary requirements necessary for removal of life
support).
189 See id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (attempting to clarify why refusal of life-
sustaining treatment falls under liberty interest).
190 See id. at 288 (noting that forced treatment burdens individual's liberty interest).
191 See Hall, supra note 173, at 840 n.28 (detailing pain that terminal patients suffer);
Reitman, supra note 109, at 308 (describing suffering of terminal patient as gnawing pain
and intractable vomiting).
192 See Ira M. Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others Can
Exercise and Incapacitated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JuRiMETRc J. 389, 400 (1989) (noting
that comatose patients feel no pain); Kathleen Kneeper, Withholding Medical Treatment
From Infants: When Is It Child Neglect, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAm. L. 1, 39 (1995) (asserting
that comatose patient suffers no pain); Stacy, supra note 180, at 494 n.14 (1992) (claiming
that conditions such as "coma" and "vegetative state" leave patients unconscious and feel-
ing no pain).
193 See, e.g., In re L. H. R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ga. 1984) (allowing termination of life-
sustaining treatment for infant who lacked 85-90% brain tissue); In Re Quinlan, 355 A.2d.
647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976) (allowing withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment from patient in
persistent vegetative state). But see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 286-87 (1990) (finding that state cannot substitute judgment of parents for that of
comatose patient in deciding whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment).
194 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (holding patient's interest in dying without life-sus-
taining equipment superseded state's interests).
195 See Daniel R. Mordarski, Notes & Comments, Medical Futility: Has Ending Life Sup-
port Become the Next 'Pro-Choice/Right to Life" Debate?, 41 CLFV. ST. L. REV. 751, 774
(1993) (stating American courts have consistently protected individual's personal auton-
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In Washington v. Glucksberg,196 the Supreme Court declared that
the rationale which supported Cruzan's right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment was grounded in the common law rule that to
forcibly medicate an individual was a battery.1 97 Justice Stevens,
however, in his concurring opinion in Vacco v. Quill, argued that
the right of Cruzan to refuse medical treatment was part of a
wider concept of freedom. 9 " This freedom embraces an individ-
ual's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment as well as an
interest in dignity and determining the character of the memories
that will last long after an individual has died.199 Cruzan illus-
trates that an individual has an interest in making decisions con-
cerning how they will confront their own deaths.2"'
These authors believe that by extending the reasoning of previ-
ous Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion 2 ' and right to
die20 2 to the physician assisted suicide context, there seems to be a
clear liberty interest protecting a terminally ill patient's decision
to hasten their death. Laws prohibiting these individuals from ob-
taining such assistance infringes upon their liberty interests." 3
omy); Jennifer E. Bennett Overton, Note, Unanswered Implication-The Clouded Rights of
the Incompetent Patient Under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1991) (commenting that right to die is often linked with individual's
right to self determination). But see Tsarouhas, supra note 34, at 800 (rejecting proponents
of assisted suicide argument that right of personal autonomy and self-determination sup-
port terminal patient's right to physician's aid-in-dying).
196 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
197 Id. at 2269 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing common law approach to individual's
personal autonomy and Cruzan).
198 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2306 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing
Cruzan).
199 See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (contending that right to die recognized in Cruzan is
broader than common law right to refuse medical treatment but encompasses right of dying
individual to control aspect of their inevitable death).
200 See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing dying individual's interest in controlling
how they will be remembered after their deaths).
201 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992) (hold-
ing that personal matters such as abortion are protected by liberty interest of Due Process
Clause); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
772 (1986) (concluding that abortion is protected by "private sphere of individual liberty");
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding that right of privacy and personal liberty
interest protect woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy); see also Banks, supra note
140, at 71 (discussing that abortion is protected liberty interest); Pirner & Williams, supra
note 140, at 187 (1993) (noting that right to abortion is protected liberty interest).
202 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (holding
that decision to remove life sustaining medical treatment is protected by liberty interest of
Due Process Clause); see also Kline, supra note 142, at 69 (discussing Cruzan and removal
of life sustaining medical treatment).
203 See Gabel, supra note 11, at 369 (discussing that prohibition of physician assisted
suicide in Washington was found to infringe on liberty interest); Previn, supra note 39, at
616 (asserting prohibition of physician assisted suicide violates patients' autonomy). But
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The government may place restrictions on an individual's liberty,
but such restrictions must not be so burdensome as to completely
restrict the ability to exercise the interest.20 4
IV. STATE INTERESTS Do NOT SUPPORT STATE BANS ON
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR TERMINALLY ILL
COMPETENT ADULTS
The existence of a compelling state interest overrides a patient's
right to determine the course of his or her own medical treat-
ment.20 5 Such state interests include the preservation of life,2 °6
prevention of suicide,20 7 deterrence of undue influence,20 8 protec-
see Mark E. Chopko & Michael J. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?, 70 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 519, 526 (1995) (arguing if autonomy is only criteria, then patient's con-
dition and motives are irrelevant).
204 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (discussing undue burden on protected liberty interest);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 802 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing undue
burden test), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); see also
Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Consti-
tutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2025, 2025 (1994) (explaining undue burden test
in which governmental restrictions placed upon exercise of constitutionally protected inter-
est will be analyzed based on whether such restrictions are unduly burdensome on
individual).
205 See generally In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (discussing how state inter-
ests sometimes trump individual interests regarding medical treatment); Joan-Margaret
Kun, Rejecting the Adage "Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard"- The Mature Minor
Doctrine, 16 PACE L. REV. 423, 445 (1996) (contending that prevention of suicide as among
compelling state interests may prevent competent patients from refusing extraordinary
treatment); Adam Marshall, Choices For a Child: An Ethical and Legal Analysis of a Failed
Surrogate Birth Contract, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 275, 296 (1996) (pointing out that compelling
state interests include maintaining ethical integrity of medical profession); Robichaud,
supra note 128, at 536 (asserting that state interests must be balanced against individual's
interests).
206 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (noting state interests in preserving life); Kline, supra
note 166, at 236 (noting state interests in preservation of life); Schuster, supra note 13, at
413 (noting state interests in preserving life); Previn, supra note 39, at 413 (noting that
state has interest in preserving life).
207 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271 (stating state has interest in preventing suicide); Com-
passion, 79 F.3d at 820 (describing state interest in preventing suicide as part of broader
interest in preserving life); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 758 (Mich. 1994) (Mallet,
J., concurring) (noting strong state interest in preventing suicide).
208 See Larson, supra note 131, at 481-82 (addressing state interest in deterring undue
influence upon competent, terminally ill patients); Sandra L. Tholen & Lisa Baird, Con
Law is as Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal
Courts, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 971, 1031 (1995) (noting state interest in preventing undue
influence in physician assisted suicide).
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tion of third parties, 20 9 and the maintenance of the integrity of the
medical profession.21 °
While preservation of life is frequently considered the most sig-
nificant state interest,2 11 the rights of patients are not, per se,
trumped. 21 2 Balancing these competing interests 21 3 includes an
examination of what benefit the patient is receiving from current
treatment and whether patient autonomy is being sacrificed.21 4
Burdens to a terminal patient in pain are far greater than the
benefits received by being kept alive against one's will.
21 5
In conjunction with the preservation of life, the state has an in-
terest in preventing suicide.2 16 It should be noted that despite this
209 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 824 (detailing state interest in protection of third par-
ties); Gumpel, supra note 88, at 371 (arguing physician assisted suicide actually protects
innocent third parties); Martha A. Matthews, Suicidal Incompetence and the Patient's
Rights to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CAL. L. REv. 707, 745 (1987) (arguing protection
of third parties was not compelling state concern).
210 Compassion, 79 F.3d at 816-817 (describing relevant state interest in maintaining
integrity of medical profession); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 581-91 (D.R.I. 1988)
(noting integrity of medical profession as state interest); Clark, supra note 44, at 81 (dis-
cussing that state interest in protecting integrity of medical profession is often used as
support for ban on physician assisted suicide).
211 See Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2304-05 (1997) (Steven, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens noted in his concurring opinion that the states interest in preservation of human
life has at times given way to other interests. Id. For example, the Supreme Court has
concluded that capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional. Id. Thus, in those in-
stances in which the statute which permits capital punishment meets the necessary consti-
tutional requirements, the state's interest in the sanctity of human life is subordinate to
other interests. Id.
212 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-24 (N.J. 1985). It has been noted that in cases
involving a patient's decision regarding their own individual fate, the "state's indirect and
abstract interest in preserving the life of the patient" is eclipsed by the patient's personal
interest in directing the course of their own lives. Id. at 1223-24. The court concluded that
denying the individual patient the right to choose to end life would actually decrease the
value of that person's life. Id. at 1209.
213 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1992) (stating that individual interest
must be weighed against relevant state interests); Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and "Liberty":
Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate
Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585, 647 (1994) (discussing balancing test involved
in weighing relevant state interest and individual liberty interest).
214 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 817 (noting that state interest in preserving life is not
always controlling); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990) (applying balancing
test and finding that non-terminal patient could not seek assisted suicide); In re Grant, 747
P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987) (noting that states interests significantly decrease if treatment
only postpones death for terminal individual); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983)
(holding that state interests weaken in cases in which treatment only prolongs terminal
patient's life); see also Anthony J. Dangelantonio, McKay v. Bergstedt, 7 IssuEs L. & MED.
351, 352 (1991) (noting that well being of patient must be balanced against state's interest).
215 See Mine, supra note 166, at 227 (opining that total ban on assisted suicide does not
properly effectuate state interests).
216 See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224 (contending that in conjunction with general interest in
preserving life, states have valid interest in preventing suicide); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d
64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (asserting state has legitimate interest in protecting lives of citizens);
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interest, suicide is no longer criminalized by states.2 17 While state
interests in the sanctity of life and the prevention of suicide are
valid, a ban on assisted death does not effectuate these
interests.2 18
Another limitation on the right of a patient regarding medical
treatment is the interest that a state may have in safeguarding
the integrity of the medical profession.219 When a physician fol-
lows the choice of a competent adult patient he can not be deemed
to have violated his professional responsibilities.22 0
The remedy to prevent any possible abuse would not be to pro-
hibit either means by which life is terminated, but to install ade-
quate safeguards to prevent such abuse.2 2' State interests are not
properly effectuated by prohibitions on assisted death.222
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are certain in-
nately personal decisions that are free from governmental intru-
sion. The decision of a terminally ill, competent patient to end life
by assisted suicide should be included among those highly per-
sonal decisions protected by the Due Process Clause. Further-
more, distinctions made between removal of life support and phy-
sician assisted suicide are specious and policy based. Therefore,
avoidance of equal protection analysis and a justification of a ban
on physician assisted suicide can not be founded upon such a
basis.
Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (dis-
cussing state interests in deterring suicide).
217 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 820 (noting that no state prohibits suicide); LAFAVE &
Scorr, supra note 42, § 74 (noting no penalty for acts of suicide).
218 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 821 (asserting state interests in prevention of suicide in
cases of terminal patient are not compelling and may pose different situation where other-
wise situated individuals are involved).
219 See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 581-91 (D.R.I. 1988) (noting integrity of medi-
cal profession as state interest); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d
677, 693 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (recognizing state interest in maintaining professional
code).
220 See Delio, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 693 (noting that doctor who effectuated individual's wishes
did not demean medical profession).
221 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 503 (proposing that safeguards are needed to success-
fully implement aid in dying procedures).
222 See id. at 503. Statutes banning such procedures are "overbroad," for they are not
tailored to achieve the desired state results while they intrude on the interests and rights
of the individual. Id.
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While the Supreme Court has declared that the New York and
Washington statutory bans on assisted suicide are not unconstitu-
tional per se, the Court recognized that it dealt with a facial chal-
lenge to the statute. Therefore, the Court has not foreclosed the
possibility of an unconstitutional application of such a statute to a
particular set of plaintiffs. Perhaps jurisprudence in this area is
best left to small steps.
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